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Abstract
The Flacian controversy in mid-16th century Lutheranism turned on the question
whether as a consequence of original sin the image of God in humankind has been lost
and replaced by the image of the devil. Is the fallen human being evil per se? Examining
Martin Luther’s comments on the story of creation and fall in his Genesis Lectures
(1535-1545), I argue that Luther’s insistence on the loss of the imago dei results in
an anthropology closer to that of Thomas Aquinas than to Luther’s uncompromising
disciple, Matthias Flacius Illyricus. For both Thomas and Luther, original sin is a holistic
term that reflects the absence of original righteousness in the essence of the soul.
Luther rejects any substantial reading of original sin that would ontologize it as the
very substance of the human being. His anthropological holism means that sin has a
deleterious effect on the whole human being, including all the powers of body and
soul. Sin is privative, a spiritual leprosy that corrupts the whole human being.
Keywords
Divinization, essence of the soul, formal substance, Genesis 1-3, image of the devil,
Martin Luther, Matthias Flacius Illyricus, original righteousness, original sin, sin as
privation

In the years immediately after Martin Luther’s death in 1546, the Lutheran
reformers heard shouts of heresy all around them. Of course, Catholic polemicists loudly accused them of departing from the orthodox faith on such important issues as justification, the mass, good works, papal authority, and more.
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Even before Luther’s death, however, Lutherans were divided among themselves, as one sees, for example, in the antinomian controversies, in frequent
criticisms of Philip Melanchthon’s teaching regarding free will and salvation,
and in many other issues. In the aftermath of the Catholic victory in the
Schmalkaldic War in 1547, these squabbles metastasized into outright conflict.
The Catholic victors moved swiftly to impose an interim religious arrangement on the Lutherans, and so to facilitate their eventual return to the Catholic
fold. The first proposed postwar arrangement, the so-called Augsburg Interim,
made some significant concessions to the Lutherans—clerical marriage and
communion in both kinds, for example. But it also re-instituted Catholic rites
and obedience to Rome with the intent of fully reintegrating the evangelical
churches into the Catholic Church.1
Arguing about how far one could licitly cooperate with such an imposed
religious regime, Luther’s heirs were soon polarized. Strict adherents to the
Reformer’s doctrine resisted the Interim. They were soon labeled the gnesioor genuine Lutherans. Their somewhat less strict Lutheran opponents, the
Philippist party, adopted a more flexible approach. They generally followed
the lead of Philip Melanchthon, who had agreed to a second and even more
conciliatory arrangement, the so-called Leipzig Interim. Seeking to preserve
the most meaningful changes brought about by the Reformation, Melanchthon
made the common-sense argument that not every theological hill was worth
dying on. Compromises could be made, he thought, on indifferent matters,
adiaphora, for example, the form of confirmation, vestments, candles, and the
like. Melanchthon’s critics vehemently disagreed. Charges and countercharges of heresy flew.
In the case of the fiery Croatian theologian Matthias Flacius Illyricus, a
leading figure among the gnesio-Lutherans, the charge of heresy stuck.2
Seeking to remain scrupulously faithful to what he believed he had learned
from Luther, Flacius made arguments that seemed to implicate him in heresy
regarding the doctrine of original sin. Following very closely Luther’s
1. For the theology and history of the intra-Lutheran controversies between Luther’s death
and the signing of the Formula of Concord, see Friedrich Bente, “Historical Introduction to
the Symbolical Books,” in Concordia Triglotta: The Symbolical Books of the Evangelical
Lutheran Church (St. Louis: Concordia, 1921), 1–256; for a more balanced recounting of
the theological ins and outs of the Flacian controversy, see Robert J. Christman, Doctrinal
Controversy and Lay Religiosity in Late Reformation Germany: The Case of Mansfeld
(Leiden: Brill, 2011), ch. 2.
2. The most recent study of Flacius is Luka Ilić, Theologian of Sin and Grace: The Process of
Radicalization in the Theology of Matthias Flacius Illyricus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 2014). See also Oliver K. Olson, Matthias Flacius and the Survival of Luther’s
Reform, 2nd rev. ed. (Minneapolis: Lutheran Press, 2011).
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teaching as he understood it, Flacius insisted that the fall had a disastrous
effect. In fallen humankind, he argued, the image of God was lost and, more
importantly, transformed into the image of the devil. When he stated this position in public debate, Flacius was forced to answer a standard Aristotelian
question:3 should sin be understood as the very substance of the fallen human
being or merely as an accident? If the question must be framed in Aristotelian
categories, Flacius replied, then yes, sin is the “formal substance” of the fallen
human being. If one interprets this claim within a hylomorphic framework, as
nearly everyone did back then, it seems to suggest that the human soul itself is
evil per se. More than that, it implies that the devil is a creator, one who can
transmute a good creature made by God into a creature that is evil per se.
Flacius’ detractors pounced upon him immediately. They argued that he had
fallen into the error of the Manichaeans. After nearly two decades of controversy, Flacius’ teaching was rejected in the Book of Concord (1577, 1580), in
which the Lutheran tradition adopted the teaching that if Aristotelian terms
must be used, then original sin is an accident rather than the very substance of
the fallen person.4
Nevertheless, nearly everyone could see that Flacius had a point. Dr Luther
had spoken of fallen humankind as bereft of the image of God and, yes, as
stamped by the image of the devil.5 On occasion, Luther had even spoken of
sin as the “essence” of the fallen human being. What did he mean by that? Had
Luther ontologized original sin, offering a substantialized account of what we
might call, somewhat perversely to be sure, the “real presence” of evil in the
fallen human person? In his own hyperbolic efforts to underscore the hopelessness of the sinner apart from grace and faith, did Luther shout himself out of
catholic orthodoxy?
3. Aristotle’s constructive role in Luther’s thought, particularly his natural philosophy, is
frequently underestimated. Aristotle also continued to play a prominent role in Lutheran
theology throughout the Reformation and into the period of confessional orthodoxy. On
“institutional Aristotelianism” and Aristotle in Luther’s theology, see Theodor Dieter,
“Scholasticisms,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Martin Luther, 3 vols., ed. Derek R.
Nelson and Paul R. Hinlicky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); here, vol. 3, 334-346.
Cited hereafter as OEML, with volume and page numbers. For more detail, see Theodor
Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Historisch-systematische Untersuchungen zum
Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001).
4. For the Lutheran resolutions regarding original sin, see The Book of Concord: The
Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 2000): Epitome, Art. 1 (487-491); Solid Declaration, Art. 1 (531542), hereafter BC.
5. For a summary and review of the literature on Luther’s understanding of sin, see L’Ubomír
Batka, “Sin,” OEML 3, 346-360.
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Attempting to answer lingering questions such as these regarding Luther’s
theological anthropology, in what follows I turn first to St Thomas Aquinas in
search of a textbook medieval catholic response to the question of the impact
of original sin on the image of God in humankind. Are fallen humans still in
the image of God? As we shall see, Thomas offers a subtle yes and no response.
On Thomas’ account, sin is “present” in the sinner as the absence of original
justice and sanctifying grace. This absence in turn gives rise to palpable consequences; privation results in depravity. With some helpful elements of
Thomas’ teaching in hand, I turn to Luther’s late Genesis lectures to examine
crucial textual evidence that could be taken to implicate him in Flacius’ heresy.
What did the old warhorse Martin Luther have to say about original sin and the
image of God in the classroom?
The point of this exercise is not to argue for Thomas’ influence on Luther,6
still less to judge which of these men was nearer the truth of the matter. Instead,
I want to assess the catholicity of Luther’s teaching by trying to discern to
what extent it leans back in the direction of St Thomas or forward toward
Flacius. On Luther’s account, as we shall see, the sin of Adam and Eve was
indeed an unqualified disaster. Examining the question of the image of God,
however, Luther repeatedly and explicitly refuses to offer an ontological
account of original sin. Instead, he develops an integral understanding of the
human being, that is, a narrative anthropological holism that stresses the consequences of original sin in the broadest terms.7 As a biblical humanist, Luther
wants to draw his understanding of the human creature out of the creation
story.8 Reading Genesis 1-3, he concludes that the fall impacts the whole person, including the powers of the soul. It does not follow, however, that
6. The standard study for the question of Luther’s reliance on Thomas has been Denis R. Janz,
Luther on Thomas Aquinas: The Angelic Doctor in the Thought of the Reformer (Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989). More recently, however, see the critical investigation in Stefan
von Gradl, “Inspektor Columbo Irrt: Kriminalistische Überlegungen,” Luther, 77, 2006,
83-99. The classic work on theological convergences between Luther and Thomas is Otto
Hermann Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin:
Versuch eines Systematisch-Theologischen Dialogs (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag,
1967). Pesch, however, does not try to demonstrate Thomas’ influence on Luther.
7. I use “holism” here to designate Luther’s claim for the intrinsic unity of the human being,
in which every distinguishable human power or aptitude is related to every other power or
aptitude in such a way that each has an impact on all.
8. Timothy J. Wengert emphasizes the humanist commitments of the Wittenberg faculty,
including Martin Luther, in his “Melanchthon, Luther, and their Wittenberg Colleagues,”
OEML, 2, 518-541. For a fascinating window onto Luther as a biblical humanist in dialogue with both Italian and transalpine humanism, see William Wright, Martin Luther’s
Understanding of God’s Two Kingdoms: A Response to the Challenge of Skepticism (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), ch. 2-3.
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everything good in the human being has been lost. Luther’s version of “total
depravity,” I will argue, cannot be understood to mean that the human creature
is evil per se. To that extent, it leans in the direction of Thomas rather than
Flacius.
The comparative procedure attempted here requires discernment. Luther
and Thomas were quite dissimilar men. Furthermore, the primary sources
drawn on below, Luther’s Genesis lectures and Thomas’ Summa Theologica,
are very different kinds of texts. Attempting to understand Luther fairly, we
should keep in mind that the oral event in which the Genesis lectures originated eventually yielded a published text not neatly comparable to systematic
works such as Thomas’ Summa. Luther, moreover, was a Renaissance(-ish)
biblical humanist who taught and sought to exemplify the distinction between
dialectic (argument) and rhetoric (adornment) in the classroom. To express this
difference in 16th-century terms, Luther’s lectures combined dialectical theological analyses with the hortatory rhetorical flourishes that gave his classroom performances their power to move hearts and minds. Luther was teaching
young Protestant evangelical students with an intent to inspire them for faithfulness and service.9 His sometimes-hyperbolic statements, perhaps especially
in the matter of original sin, must be understood through that lens.

Thomas’ Privative Account of Original Sin and the Imago
Dei
Our inquiry into Thomas begins with the observation that the doctrine of creation was central for Thomas’ work. Indeed, as Josef Pieper has observed, creation is the often-unrecognized Notenschlüssel to Thomas’ theology as a whole,
the clef that unlocks the melody of his thought so that we can hear it played
aright.10

God’s Creation
Working through the doctrine of creation, Thomas considers the relation of the
creation to the Creator. He suggests a theological point of departure. What if
one begins by thinking about the Word of God, that is, the eternal Son of the
9. Broadly to the question of Luther’s classroom purposes, one may consult John A. Maxfield,
Luther’s Lectures on Genesis and the Formation of Evangelical Identity (Kirksville:
Truman State University Press, 2008).
10. Josef Pieper, Unaustrinkbares Licht: Das negative Element in der Weltansicht des Thomas
von Aquin (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), 16f. Cited in David Berger, “Schöpfungslehre,”
in Thomas Handbuch, ed. Volker Leppin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 338–47, at 339.
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eternal Father? This only-begotten Son, he notes, is understood as the “interior
Word” of the Father, in such a way that he remains within the Father even as
he is begotten from Him. Pondering the mystery of the Word of God, therefore,
attention is drawn to an ad intra relation within the Godhead that is both internal and eternal. As an irreducible relational reality within the one God, the
Word of God is a Person, the eternal Son of the eternal Father, the personally
subsistent emanation of the divine Mind.11 Examining the eternal divine relation between this Word and its Speaker, Thomas senses a hint of the possibility
of a further relation, one that extends, so to speak, outside the Godhead. Thus,
a new question arises: “Does the name Word import relation to creatures?”
Thomas answers, “because God by one act understands Himself and all things,
His one Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures.”12
Enclosed within the relational identity of the Word, one discovers a hint of
God’s relations ad extra, with everything, that is, outside of God.
Thomas next puts to work a distinction between expression and operation.
Ad intra—so Thomas—the Word is the expression of the mind of the Father;
ad extra, however, the Word both expresses and operates. The Word expresses
creatures as they are found in the eternal divine act of knowing and works
them up into being. Here a further question arises. Given that the Son or Word
of God is understood as an eternal Person within the Godhead, is the creation
expressed through the Word also eternal? The question of eternal creation,
which seems to be the position of Aristotle, was alive and well in the Paris of
Thomas’ day. Robert Pasnau explains,
Bonaventure had argued that . . . Creation ex nihilo necessarily implies a temporal
beginning. According to Aquinas, on the other hand, creation from nothing means that
things are caused by God in their complete being. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that the creation had a temporal beginning. A cause does not necessarily
precede its effect in duration [time], but can be simultaneous with the effect.13

Therefore, one cannot rule out philosophically the possibility of an eternal
creation. Absent philosophical demonstration, one can know that the world
began in time only by divine revelation.14 To this, we must add the following.
God for Thomas is named as the Creator both in reference to His being the
11. Aquinas, Summa Theologica (hereafter ST) I, Q. 34, A. 2. I use here and in what follows the
Aquinas Institute’s online Latin-English parallel text, <https://aqiunas.cc/la/en/~ST.I>.
12. ST I, Q. 34, A. 3.
13. See Robert Pasnau, “Philosophy of Mind and Human Nature,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Thomas Aquinas. Oxford Handbooks Online, accessed 14 March 2019. DOI: 10.1093/oxf
ordhb/9780195326093.013.0027.
14. He makes this argument in De aeternitate mundi.
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initial cause of the creation’s existence and for his continuing conservation of
it. Creation and conservation are logically distinct, but they name a single continuous act. God was and is the Creator.

Adam: Immortal and Undeceivable
In the unspoiled paradise of the original creation, Thomas’Adam was in a very
good place, and so he had many good reasons to be grateful. According to
Thomas, Adam was immortal before sin. Death had no place, for “by sin death
came into the world.”15 In the garden of paradise, Adam also experienced the
blessing of knowing God. Thomas considers this knowledge good but imperfect. The imperfection derives from the fact that the creature’s knowledge of
the infinite Creator can never be complete. No created thing can comprehend
God entirely. Nevertheless, Adam knew God, and the power of the soul by
means of which he did so was the intellect. Rational creatures, both angelic
and human, participate in God more deeply than non-rational ones.
Before his fall, Adam knew God through the same senses through which he
knew the natural world. This natural knowledge of God, however, was limited.
It offered only a foretaste of the kind of knowledge of God that transcends natural means. The vision of God in his essence, beatitude properly so called, was
not included in Adam’s original powers. If Adam already possessed that vision,
Thomas reckons, he could not have turned away from God and fallen into sin.16
Therefore, the unfallen Adam enjoyed the knowledge of God as mediated to
him by the creation but had not yet been granted the beatific vision.
This is not necessarily to say that Adam in the original creation lacked any
direct knowledge of God. Thomas allows one other possible route through
which Adam before the fall may have known God, this one based on a surmise
Augustine made in his literal commentary on Genesis. Thomas quotes
Augustine thus:
Perhaps God used to speak the truth to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by
shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him
the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine
Essence.17

Adam’s knowledge of God thus surpassed our own. It came to him by means
of the creation itself, and perhaps also through an inner word that served as a
15. ST I, Q. 97, A. 1. Citing Romans 5:12, Thomas says that man was made immortal.
16. ST I, Q. 94, A. 1.
17. ST I, Q. 94, A.1.
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foretaste of the blessedness to come. In his original integrity, moreover,
Thomas believes that Adam could not be deceived. In the state of original
innocence, “it was impossible for the human intellect to consent to falsehood.”18 Adam’s first sin, therefore, began not in the intellect, but in the will.

What Is Original Sin?
What does original sin mean for Thomas? In short, that everyone loses. By his
sin, Adam lost the gifts of sanctifying grace and original justice with which he
had been created. Before sin, Adam had these gifts in the “essence of the soul”
(i.e. the principle of the soul’s unity; that which allows one to say “I see you”
rather than “my power of vision sees you”). The essence of the soul denotes
the form of the body. It is the integrating principle of the human being. A twofold order characterized Adam at his creation: sanctifying grace ordered his
will and intellect in submission to God, whereas original justice ordered his
appetites in submission to reason.19 The ordered wholeness of the human
depended vitally upon the interconnection of sanctifying grace and original
justice with the human intellect, will, and appetites. But these gifts were lost,
for Adam and his progeny, through original sin.
Original sin, therefore, is formally present in the soul of every son or daughter of Adam as this absence. How does that work? In the Prima Secundae,
Thomas considers the question “Whether original sin is in the essence of the
soul [in essentia animae] rather than in the powers.” He answers that “Original
sin is called the sin of nature [peccatum naturale] . . . Therefore, the soul is the
subject of original sin chiefly in respect to its essence [principaliter secundum
suam essentiam].”20 Original sin, in short, is privative, depriving the human
soul of the original grace that ordered it to God as highest good.
This privation, however, has palpable consequences. Lacking the gifts of
sanctifying grace and original justice, the faculties of the soul become disordered. Whereas in the rightly ordered person the intellect rules over the will
and the lower appetitive powers, in the fallen person disorder dis-integrates
her. Original sin corrupts the created integrity of the human being. Privation
understood as a formal absence thus yields material consequences. The privation of original sin manifests itself in “disordered dispositions.” Thus, Thomas
can say that original sin “is more than mere privation. It is a corrupt habit.”21
Original sin is in the essence of the soul as a privation. In the powers of the
18.
19.
20.
21.

ST I, Q. 94, A.4.
ST I.II, Q. 82.
ST I.II, Q. 83, A. 2.
ST I.II, Q. 82, A. 1.
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soul, however, it is an inclination to act in disobedience to God’s law. Such
disobedience begins with the will, which is the seat of the human inclination
to act. The human soul, therefore, as to both its essence and its powers, is
fallen. Although he or she is still in possession of intellect, will, and so on,
everything in the fallen person is touched by original sin.
The complex of corrupt habits in fallen humankind has a name: disordered
concupiscence. It is crucial in this connection to note that for Thomas concupiscence in its proper denotation is simply the name for the soul’s powers of
attraction to the good. The concupiscent powers of the soul are gifts of God,
natural goods. Bodily desires, whether for food or for sex, for example, are
consistent with Adam’s original justice. Thus, Adam in his original condition
was a rational animal with a spiritual destiny: animal insofar as he was an animated and embodied creature, rational by capacities given in his creation, and
able to keep himself in order and to know and love his Maker by means of the
special divine gifts of original righteousness and sanctifying grace. After the
fall, however, the soul’s concupiscible powers have become disordered. The
tangible external consequences of fallen humankind’s internal disorder constitute the material effects of the fall on ourselves and our world.
Thomas also considers the question what happens to sin in the sacrament of
baptism. The answer is that baptism remits original and actual sin, both as to
guilt and as to punishment. In the usual case of the baptized infant, however,
only original sin is remitted, since infants do not yet have actual sin. Thomas
also makes a useful distinction between peccatum originale originans—that
is, the one originating sin of Adam in terms of its effect on the historical Adam
and Eve—and peccatum originale originatum—that is, the originated original
sin, which affects their progeny.22 In the case of infants who die having only
that originated sin and no actual sin, their sin does not merit damnation.
Instead, it merits only the loss of the beatific vision of God. In the afterlife,
therefore, they occupy a sort of permanent middle ground between damnation
and beatitude. This middle place, where the dead neither suffer nor enjoy the
beatific vision, is referred to as the “limbo of infants.”23 With that we come to
the question of the image of God.
22. ST I.II, Q. 82. This notion originates in a letter of Innocent III written in 1201: “Poena
originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei, actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus” (The penalty of original sin is the loss of the vision of God, whereas
the penalty of actual sin is everlasting torture in hell). The text of this letter is provided in
Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus
Fidei et Morum, ed. 32 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1963), no. 780 (p. 251). Thomas
seems to have assumed this as an authoritative teaching.
23. ST Supplementum, Q. 69-71.
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A Lost Image?
So, lacking the gifts of sanctifying grace and original justice, are fallen human
beings still made in the image of God? For Thomas, yes and no. First the yes.
Thomas often speaks of the image of God as located in the mind, the intellect.
While there are traces of the Trinity in the human body, as in all other bodies,
the concrete location of the image of God is the intellectual soul. The human
intellect images God first insofar as its own acts of knowledge echo the internal dynamism of the Holy Trinity.24 Thomas writes,
Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of
the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our
soul word “cannot exist without actual thought,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of
the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual
thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love.25

Here, the divine Speaker corresponds to the human capacity for knowledge,
the divine Word to what happens when that knowledge comes forth as thought,
and the divine Love to the way human love comes to be through the exercise
of the will. Knowledge, thought, and love: these three logically parallel
moments constitute the image of the Trinity in the human being. The human
relation to God thus has a call-and-response character. The human intellectual
trinity of mind, word, and love reflects and is elevated by grace to participate
in the Mind, Word, and Love that is the Holy Trinity. To this extent, the image
of God is intact.
For Thomas, fallen humans remain the image of God in another sense as
well.26 In Adam’s fall, the natural human inclination to the good was diminished but not destroyed. People still have this inclination, although it exists
only in the jumble of internal contradictions that sinners experience as a consequence of disordered concupiscence. The fallen offspring of Adam, in other
words, retain an innate sense of true moral first principles, what Thomas elsewhere characterized as practical reason. For example, humans innately know
that “evil is to be avoided” and that “nothing illicit is to be done.”27 Here, too,
24. I lean here on the works of Ian P. McFarland, “When Time Is of the Essence: Aquinas and
the Imago Dei,” New Blackfriars, 82(963), 2001, 208-223, and Montague Brown, “Imago
Dei in Thomas Aquinas,” The Saint Anselm Journal, 10(1), 2014, 1-11.
25. ST I, Q. 93, A.7.
26. ST I.II, Q. 85, A. 2.
27. To this, see Tobias Hoffman, “Conscience and Synderesis,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). DOI: 10.1093/oxfor
dhb/9780195326093.013.0020.
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humankind remains the image of God, even if amid the confusions of life in a
fallen world this image has been tarnished. In what sense, then, is it proper to
say that the image of God has been lost? Solely in the loss of the supernatural
gifts given to Adam: sanctifying grace and original justice. In Thomas’ careful
reading of the ins and outs of creation and fall, therefore, humankind after
Adam’s sin both is and is not the image of God. Human beings are fallen, and
their innate goodness is corrupted by actual sin. Nevertheless, they are not evil
per se.

A Holistic Anthropology
Luther’s Rationalism: An Appropriation of Scholastic Tradition
The elder Luther’s reading of the creation story repeats much of what he knew
from patristic and medieval tradition, including a good deal of what we have
noted from Thomas, above. Unlike Thomas’ step-by-careful-step analysis,
however, Luther’s quasi-extemporaneous lectures reflect the professor’s penchant for selectivity, digression, and repetition. He sometimes raises a question, for example, but declines to pursue it. Elsewhere he briefly digresses on
an issue, as in his mention of the anthropomorphites, with whom he expresses
a certain sympathy because Scripture itself so often portrays God in human
terms. But he takes the matter no further. Reading Luther’s interpretation of
Genesis, one also finds that he is dependent upon the antecedent traditions of
theology and exegesis, but that he adds twists and turns that seem very much
his own.28
Consider Luther’s insistence on God’s moment-by-moment engagement in
the creation. Creation, he thinks, is not a past fact separable from a subsequent
concursus dei generalis. Instead, it is a present reality, a creatio continua.29
28. For a study of traditional and distinctive elements in Luther’s Genesis exegesis, see Mickey
L. Mattox, “Defender of the Most Holy Matriarchs:” Martin Luther’s Interpretation of the
Women of Genesis in the Enarrationes in Genesin 1535-1545 (Leiden: Brill, 2003). I cite
Luther here from the American Edition, Luther’s Works, 55 vols. plus 20 vols. Continuation
Edition (Philadelphia and St. Louis: Fortress Press and Concordia Publishing House, 1955),
and from the Weimar critical edition, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe
(Weimar: Böhlau, 1883). Hereafter cited as LW (volume and page numbers) and WA (with
volume, page, and line numbers). For a provocative study that underscores the singularity
of Luther’s approach to the Genesis text, see Rafael Magarik, “Free Indirect Revelation:
Luther’s Moses and the Narration of Genesis,” Reformation, 24(1), 2019, 3-23.
29. The still-unsurpassed study of Luther’s doctrine of creation is David Löfgren, Die
Theologie der Schöpfung bei Luther (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960). Also
of importance is Johannes Schwanke, Creatio ex nihilo: Luthers Lehre von der Schöpfung
aus dem Nichts in der Großen Genesisvorlesung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004). For Luther’s
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God’s Word remains present in its power and effect not only in extraordinary
events but even more in the everyday wonders that surround us. For Luther,
this is highly personal. God has created not only Adam and Eve but also you
and me. The Word that spoke humankind into existence remains present today
in all its original power and effect. Thus, Luther focuses on the everyday miracles people tend to take for granted—for example, that the sun runs through
the sky along a regular path; that the heavier land reposes atop the lighter
water; and that mice spontaneously generate from the dust bunnies left behind
by the lazy housemaid!30 Better to focus on the wonders that surround us each
day, Luther seems to suggest, than to seek new portents in the skies. Having
given the back of his hand to the would-be science of astrology, he nevertheless draws attention to the many opportunities God provides for humans to
wonder at the beauty of the creation and ipso facto the goodness of its Creator.
Indeed, Luther sees divine design everywhere he looks; nature stands ever at
the ready to provide stirring witness to God’s ongoing work. He praises astronomy and rehearses for his students the fundamentals of Ptolemaic cosmology.
All this, he says, “we approve” and find “most worthy of praise.” The findings
of cosmological studies should be recognized as a “great benefit,” he says, for
astronomy provides the “first principles of the most noble arts.”31
Given this praise for the human capacity to know, it is doubly significant
that Luther also affirms the traditional exegetical finding that the breath of
God mentioned in Genesis 2 denotes not the infusion of the divine Spirit but
the gift of the intellectual soul. Indeed, Luther offers a ringing endorsement of
this traditional reading. We glimpse his rationalist side in his unequivocal
praise for the gift of the intellect. The following quote neatly mitigates against
any too-easy dismissal of Luther as a fideist and reminds us that he respected
the work of his colleagues in the arts faculty (teachers of, for example, mathematics, grammar and logic, astronomy, music). In his remarks on the creation
of the heavenly bodies on day 4 of the Genesis account, he says:
. . . the intellect . . . does not exist in other earthly creatures. With the support of the
mathematical disciplines—which no one can deny were divinely revealed—the
human being, in his mind, soars high above the earth; and leaving behind those
understanding of ontology in relation to the creatio continua, see Sammeli Juntunen,
“Luther and Metaphysics: What Is the Structure of Being According to Luther?” in Union
with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W.
Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 129-160.
30. LW 1.51-2; WA 42.38.25-39.14.
31. My translation. See WA 42.21.15, “quia principia pulcherrimarum artium ex verisimilibus
rationibus collecta continent.”
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things that are on the earth he concerns himself with heavenly things and explores
them. Cows, pigs, and other beasts do not do this; it is man alone who does it.
Therefore, man is a creature made to inhabit the celestial regions and to live an
eternal life when, after a while, he has left the earth. For this is the meaning of the
fact that he can not only speak and form judgments (things which belong to
dialectics and rhetoric) but also learns all the sciences thoroughly. Now, therefore,
from this fourth day our glory begins to be revealed: that God gives thought to
making a creature which may understand the motion of the bodies created on the
fourth day and may take delight in that knowledge which is proper to his nature.32

Importantly, Luther’s praise of the intellect here parallels the distinctive
language in which he describes God’s act of creation. As God in his Word
speaks, so the human being in the intellect understands. Moreover, when
Moses reports the words of God on each of the days of creation, these words
are to be understood as real divine speech, even if, to be sure, Luther does not
think they were produced by breath. Indeed, the power of these words of creation provides the paradigm for divine speech more broadly in Luther’s thought.
Luther says,
God calls into existence things which do not exist. He does not speak grammatical
words; He speaks true and existent realities. Accordingly, that which among us has
the sound of a word is a reality with God. Thus sun, moon, heaven, earth, Peter,
Paul, I, you, etc.—we are all words of God [vocabula dei], in fact only one single
syllable or letter by comparison with the entire creation.33

Similarly, Luther will sometimes say the announcement of the Good News of
God’s forgiveness by grace and for Christ’s sake takes the nothing of the sinner
and creates it anew. The point is not that sinners are nihil full stop, nor that
grace must destroy nature in order to do its work. Instead, he means only that
the fallen sinner lacks the internal resources to forgive and restore himself to
the grace and favor of God. In this sense, justification is an act of divine recreation. Vocabula dei are words or letters spoken by God. All creatures are
such vocabula. Human beings, however, are both spoken words of God and
creatures who possess a divinely given aptitude for the intellectual apprehension of God’s words.
For Luther, the sound of the words of creation has not diminished since they
were first spoken. As he states in the Small Catechism, God’s act of creation
32. LW 1.46; WA 42.34.37-35.11. I have emended the LW translation slightly. For the last
sentence here the LW has “delight in that knowledge as part of his nature.” The Latin text
is: “quae propria sit suae naturae.” Emphasis added.
33. LW 1.21-2; WA 42.17.18-20.
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should be understood not only cosmically but also personally and subjectively:
“I believe that God has created me and all things that exist.”34 He also clarifies
that these words are to be understood as spoken by God’s own eternal Word:
The created word is made by the uncreated Word. What else is the entire creation
than the Word of God uttered by God, or extended to the outside? But the uncreated
Word of God is a divine thought [divina cogitatio], an internal order [iussio interna],
abiding within God, and the same with God, and nevertheless a distinct Person.35

This logo-centric reading of the act of creation should not at all be seen as an
innovation, but instead as borrowed in its essentials from the antecedent
Christian tradition. Indeed, Luther closely parallels what we noted above in
Thomas’ doctrine of creation: the recognition of the Word of God as the internal expression of the Mind of God almost “imports” the external expression of
the Word in the form of the creation. This is not a matter about which Luther
speculates further. To be sure, his emphasis on the Word’s role here in no way
diminishes his conviction that the creation is the work of the undivided Holy
Trinity.36 But he seems to recognize a certain fittingness, if you will, in the
agency appropriated to the Word in God’s creation. Thus, the divine decision
to create, on Luther’s reading, seems to be grounded more in what God is than,
say, in an impenetrable act of the divine will.
Wondering at the seemingly incomprehensible display of the stars in the
heavens, which might seem to have been flung into their places willy-nilly,
Luther raises the question whether God is indeed a God of order. Though the
heavens are vast, he assures his listeners, within them “there is the highest order
[summus ordo], established by the wisest mind [sapientissima mente].”37 The
wisdom of God is on display in the creation, and the human creature herself is
uniquely endowed with an intellect to recognize and know it. This human aptitude for knowledge applies both to the creation itself and to the Creator. Indeed,
these two kinds of knowledge are inextricably intertwined. For Luther, unfallen
humankind knew the creation not only for what it is in itself but also for its first
and final causes. As noted above, moreover, knowledge of the creation and its
Creator is proper (propria) to the human being as made by God.38
34. BC, 354. On the first article of the Apostles’ Creed, “I believe in God, the Father Almighty,
Creator of heaven and earth.” Emphasis mine.
35. LW 1. 22; WA 42.17.24-8. Translation slightly emended.
36. On this issue, one may consult my “Faith in Creation: God in Martin Luther’s Sermons on
Genesis 1,” Trinity Journal, 39NS(2), 2018, 199-219.
37. Cf. LW 1.32-3 (translation altered); WA 42.24.41-2: “Et tamen summus est ordo, ex sapientissima mente constitutus.”
38. Further to this twofold knowledge, see my “Cosmology,” OEML 1, 296-313, esp. 306-309.
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Thus, when Luther turns to consider Adam and Eve’s created minds, he
emphasizes their capacity to know both their world and their wise Creator.
Insight, he figures, was necessary for Adam and Eve to fulfill their divinely
given mandate to “have dominion.” In this connection, he can even speak in
the most superlative terms of the noetic capacities of our first parents as
divine. Indeed, lamenting the loss of the dominion the primal couple once
exercised over the creation, Luther clearly divinizes humankind’s royal first
parents:
Here the rule [regnum] is assigned to that most beautiful creature, who knows God
and is the image of God, in whom the similitude of the divine nature shines forth
through his enlightened reason [rationem illuminatum], though his justice and his
wisdom. Adam and Eve were made the rulers [rectores] of the earth, the sea, and
the air . . . Even this small part [particulam] of the divine image we have lost, so
much so that we do not even have insight [intelligamus] into that fullness of joy and
bliss which Adam derived from his contemplation of all the animal creatures. All
our faculties today are leprous, indeed dull and utterly dead. Who today can
conceive of that share of the divine nature [portionem divinae naturae],39 that
Adam and Eve had insight into all the dispositions of all animals, into their
characters and all their powers?40

Luther also insists that the gift of insight was bestowed equally upon the
woman, who was to rule with her husband over all the earth:
If . . . we are looking for an outstanding philosopher, let us not overlook our first
parents while they were still free from sin. They had a most perfect knowledge of
God . . . [and] the most dependable knowledge of the stars and of the whole of
astronomy. Eve had these mental gifts in the same degree as Adam . . .41

Sharing in the divine nature, the unfallen Adam and Eve were co-rulers over
the creation. For that reason, God gave them everything they would need,
including insight into the nature and characteristics of the creation.
39. This is an allusion to 2 Pet. 1:4: “that by these [promises of God] you may become partakers of the divine nature.” In the revision of the Vulgate Bible published by the Wittenberg
reformers in 1520, the italicized phrase is translated as “fiatis consortes divinae naturae.”
WA, Deutsche Bibel 5.774.33.
40. LW 1.66; WA 42.49. Translation emended. Luther’s mention here of a “small particle”
should not be taken to mean that the first humans had only a particle of the image. He
means that the dominion they exercised was itself only one small aspect of that image.
41. LW 1.66; WA 42.50.6: “Haec fuerunt in Haeva aeque atque in Adamo.” Cf. Thomas’s similar remarks at ST I, Q. 93, A. 4: “The image of God with regard to that in which it primarily
consists, namely the intellectual nature, is as much in the woman as in the man.”
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Man the Microcosm: More on the Trinity in Humankind
As embodied creatures endowed with the gift of the intellect and the image of
God, humankind stands somehow in the middle of the creation. Commenting
on Genesis 1:27, Luther says,
Other animals are called the footprints [vestigia] of God, but only humankind is the
image of God, just as one finds in the Sentences. For in the other animals God is
known as it were in the footprints. However, in the human being, especially in
Adam, He is truly known, because in him there is such wisdom, justice, and
knowledge of all things that he is rightly called a microcosm. For he understands
heaven, earth, and the whole creation.42

In this section of the lectures, Luther also offers an extensive rehearsal of the
Augustinian tradition of the Trinity in man, briefly exploring its different possible referents: mind, memory, and will; faith, hope, and love; and power, wisdom, and justice.43 All this he broadly affirms.
However, he frets about it. Why? “There is also added,” he notes, “an
argument concerning free will [disuptatio de libero arbitrio], which has its
origin in that image.”44 Some argue, Luther claims, that just as God is free,
so also the man made in God’s image is free, and precisely in terms of his
memory, his mind, and, crucially, his will.45 From this argument, Luther
complains, the erroneous conclusion has been drawn that the human free will
remains unimpaired after the fall and that it functions as the first and efficient cause of salvation. Thus, he accepts and agrees with the traditional idea
that the imago dei can be meaningfully understood as the Trinity in man. But
he thinks this goes terribly wrong when it informs a scheme of self-salvation
based on the free exercise of the unimpaired free will. The powers of the
42. WA 42.51. Translation mine. As the mention of the Sentences makes clear, Luther is here
following Peter Lombard. Both the Seitz edition of 1544 and the Weimar critical edition
give the term “microcosm” in Greek.
43. LW 1.60; WA 42.45.1-23. Cf. Thomas, ST I, Q. 93, A. 6: “While in all creatures there is
some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness to God by
way of the image [similitudo Dei per modum imaginis] . . . whereas in other creatures we
find a likeness by way of a trace [per modum vestigii].”
44. LW 1.61; WA 42.45.26-7. Translation emended. The LW translates disputatio here as
“discussion.”
45. The most prominent target of this criticism is likely Gabriel Biel, the Tübingen nominalist
theologian whose writings the young Luther studied carefully. Perhaps Biel also influenced
Luther to view Thomas Aquinas in a similar fashion. See John Farthing, Thomas Aquinas
and Gabriel Biel: Interpretations of Thomas Aquinas in German Nominalism on the Eve of
the Reformation (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988).
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soul, important though they surely are, cannot tell the full story of the image
of God. After all, he reasons, the devil, too, has memory, intellect, and will.
Is Satan, therefore, also the image of God? As an aside, we might note here
that Thomas had recognized that angels, precisely as intellectual creatures,
also bear the divine image. Thomas thought that in some ways the angels are
more perfectly in the image, while in other ways humans are.46 As a fallen
angel, it would seem correct on Thomas’ account to recognize the devil as
created in the image of God.
For his part, Luther does not explain to what extent he thinks the devil lacks
the image of God. He turns instead to the divine image in humankind, which,
he argues, consisted of much more than faculties alone. Think, he admonishes
his students, of the tranquility with which the first humans carried the clearest
intellect, the best memory, the rightest will. He exhorts them to take note of the
congruence between these internal faculties of the soul and the “superb qualities” of their bodies. Behold Adam and Eve in shameless embrace, unembarrassed before God. And now consider us fallen humans. All the powers, all the
tranquility, all the god-like attributes stand corrupted. In one sense, therefore,
sin works on the imago dei like a leprosy, gradually eroding it away. But in a
deeper sense, Luther thinks, it affects the whole person, as one can see when
one is fearful or ashamed, guilty or unloving. In such instances, one is not fearful, ashamed, guilty, or unloving only in some part of himself, say, in the will,
the mind, or the emotions. Such matters as fear and shame necessarily involve
the whole person. One is not fallen in one part and upright in another. For
Luther, one’s whole person is fallen, even if the good gifts that belong to
human nature are in some sense intact. All the particular capacities of the
human being are touched somehow by our estrangement from God, where the
specter of death looms ever over us.47
In his reading of Genesis 3:7, Luther reflects on the “glories” of the state of
original innocence. Fearlessness and a heart full of love for God were unmistakable markers of the human being’s original condition. Nakedness, too.
“What could be a greater corruption,” he asks rhetorically, “than that nakedness, which beforehand was a glory, is turned into the utmost disgrace?”
Answering his own question, Luther returns to a version of the Trinity in the
human being. Here once again, the shame fallen people associate with nakedness signals a deep internal corruption. Luther says,
46. ST I, Q. 93, A. 3.
47. Holism of this sort is reflected in Luther’s early Romans lectures as well. In his comments
on Rom. 7:17, for example, he remarks that concupiscence, “the flesh,” is an infirmity of
the whole person. See LW 25.340-41; WA 56.350-1.
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How much greater is the disgrace in this [i.e., the fall], that the will [voluntas] is
impaired, the intellect [intellectus] corrupted, and reason [ratio] completely faulty
and even morphed into something altogether different [in aliud mutata est].48

This text once again underscores Luther’s anthropological holism. Vestiges of
the Trinity remain in the fallen human, but all of them are marred by sin.
Original righteousness, he thinks, is just another name for the whole uncorrupted human being: upright, fearless, gloriously naked, and saturated with the
love and knowledge of God. All this—so Luther—has been lost.
By comparison, the unfallen Adam, blessed with the imago dei, was upright
before God; he and Eve lived completely without fear. Why? No death. They
had the image of the living God and possessed with that a reflexive confidence
in their immortality. But how different is the human situation after the fall,
when to live in the image of God is “something unknown” (re incognita).49
Instead, we palpably experience not only the privation of this image but also
all the evils that follow in its wake: loss of dominion, sinful lusts, out-of-control passions, inordinate emotions, fear of death and every other danger, bodies
degraded in every way, and nature virtually opaque to our gaze, its inner workings unknown:
Who is there who could understand what it means to be in a life free from fear,
without terrors and dangers, and to be wise, upright, good, and free from all
disasters, spiritual as well as physical? However, it is greater even than these things
that Adam was capable of eternal life [capax aeternae vitae].50

The gap between the lived experience, albeit brief, of the unfallen Adam and
Eve and that of all their progeny could hardly be wider. Luther’s conclusion?
“These and similar evils are the image of the devil, who stamped them on us.”51

Imago diaboli?
Recall now that for Thomas original sin meant that Adam had lost original justice and sanctifying grace. Original sin is privative; it entails a loss. Materially,
48. LW 1.166; WA 42.124.29-31. Considerable advances have been made recently on Luther’s
view of reason. See for example, Theodor Dieter, “Martin Luther’s Understanding of
‘Reason’,” Lutheran Quarterly, XXV, 2011, 249-278; Hans-Peter Grosshans, “Reason
and Philosophy,” OEML, 3, 221-239. See also Bruce D. Marshall, “Faith and Reason
Reconsidered: Luther and Aquinas on Deciding What’s True,” The Thomist, 63, 1999,
1-48.
49. LW 1.63; WA 42.47.31.
50. WA 42.49.1-4.
51. LW 1.63; WA 42.47.22: “Haec et similia mala sunt imago Diaboli, qui ea nobis impressit.”
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however, the absence of original justice and sanctifying grace results in disordered dispositions, corrupt habits. Therefore, the human being remains the
image of God insofar as the stamp of the Trinity abides, that is, so long as one
remains in possession of the intellectual soul, with mind, memory, and will. To
what extent does Luther’s language of the imago diaboli in fallen humankind
contradict the position taken by Aquinas, that humans retain the image even if
it sits amid the ruins of disorder and corruption?
Luther’s mention of the imago diaboli may seem to imply a real contradiction. It is customary to acquit Luther of any such charge by appealing to the
subject matter under discussion. Luther’s concerns, it is said, were soteriological rather than ontological. Christman, for example, says that “when Luther
addressed the issue of original sin, most often he spoke in terms of its impact
on the relationship between God and humanity, not on its effect on substance
humanity [sic] and the quality of that substance.”52 Instead, so it has been
argued, Luther’s point has to do with the sinner’s mimetic response to the
devil’s lead.53 As the devil rebelled against God and sought to establish his
own way, his own good and evil, so human beings do also when they follow
his lead. The devil, on this account, is the original version of which the fallen
human person’s imitatio is merely a ghostly reflection. From what we have
seen above, it seems that one could also say that for Luther there is a real difference between the imago dei and the imago diaboli, namely, that the former
includes a real portio or sharing in the divine nature. Although Luther’s claim
for the inversion of the imago dei into the imago diaboli may seem to suggest
a neat pair of opposites, there is instead a crucial disproportion. Human beings
in the image of God reflect God, share in his rule over the creation, and participate in the divine nature. Human beings who imitate the devil reflect him, but
they neither share his rule nor find their being in him. Indeed, they lose themselves through corruption and privation.
Thus, Luther’s account of original sin includes the fundamentally catholic
conviction that sin undoes the sinner. It affects an incremental decreation.
Indeed, the language in which Luther’s understanding of sin is always
couched—the loss of original gifts, a leprosy on the powers of the soul, a corruption of the integrity of nature—shows that it is privative, and therefore not,
so to speak, additive. If that is so, then Luther does not ontologize sin. To put
it in the terms that would later be used by Flacius, original sin is not the “formal substance” that shapes the matter that is the human being. Original sin,
52. Doctrinal Controversy, cited above, p. 59.
53. To this point, see Phil Anderas, Renovatio: Martin Luther’s Augustinian Theology of Sin,
Grace and Holiness (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 46-49.
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moreover, does not change or mutate the human being into something else, as
Flacius believed. His critics saw both those ideas as heretical, and on those
grounds polemicized against him as a “Manichaean,” that is, one who ontologizes evil and in doing so perversely turns the devil into a creator. Surely
Luther did not do either of those things.

Luther on Original Sin and the “essentia hominis”
Or did he? In his study of the Flacian controversy, Christman notes that the
Lutheran Cyriakus Spangenberg, a supporter of Flacius, claimed that in the
Genesis lectures Luther asserted that “sin is of the substance of man” (peccatum
esse de substantia hominis). “Spangenberg,” Christman writes, “insisted that
Luther meant that the very essence of postlapsarian man is sin.”54 Christman also
notes that he was unable to find such a text in the Genesis lectures. Nor have I.
However, there is a text that says something quite like it. To understand it
aright, one needs to have recourse to the original Latin text. Published in eight
hefty volumes, the LW translation of the Genesis lectures is a marvelous tool
and we are all deeply in debt to those who provided it for us. On occasion,
however, when for some reason one turns to the Latin text, difficulties or insufficiencies become apparent. As noted above, some texts that suggest a human
participation in God along the lines of divinization were translated in ways that
obscure their meaning. Likewise with the question of original sin and its
impact on the essence of the human being.
As we have seen, instead of dismantling the human being into constituent
components among which either original righteousness or original sin might
be seen as a “part,” Luther offers a holistic interpretation. The LW translation,
as noted above, sometimes obscures this, too. In one case, it also seems to lend
credence to Spangenberg’s otherwise unsubstantiated claim regarding the
Genesis lectures. In this case, Luther’s talk about the impact of original sin is
translated with the phrases “part of nature” and “part of the essence.”55 Taking
a closer look, we find Luther busy treating the original sin itself, at Genesis
3:7. Here there is mention of an essence, but not of a “part” (pars). Concerned
to show just what an unmitigated disaster the first sin truly was, Luther takes
as his point of departure the opinion that original justice was not natural but a
superadded gift. As we shall see, he does not agree:
But just look what follows from that opinion, that is, if we say that original
righteousness was not natural but a gift somehow superfluous to it, “superadded.”
54. Doctrinal Controversy, p. 66.
55. LW 1.166.
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If you set down that righteousness was not from the essence of the human being [de
essentia hominis], does it not follow that the sin that comes after it was also not of
the essence of the human being [de essentia hominis]? And does this not defeat the
purpose of sending Christ our Redeemer, since therefore original righteousness,
like something alien to our nature, has been lost while our natural endowments
remain whole? What more unworthy thing can be said by a theologian!?56

The language here is crucial. It should first be noted that Luther affirms that
Adam is created with grace, which situates him once again within medieval
tradition and on Thomas’ side of it.57 Next, observe that Luther does not say
“sin is the essence of the human being” (peccatum essentia hominis est). Nor
does he say that sin is “part of the essence.” Instead, he says simply that “sin
is of the essence of the human being.” This is a decisive difference. Sin pertains to the essence. The parallel Luther appeals to between the gift of original
righteousness and the corruption of original sin is revelatory, moreover, particularly now that we have discovered the holistic terms in which Luther wants
to speak of the human being.
Recall as well that the doctor communis himself had defined original sin as
“in the essence of the soul” (in essentia animae). With Thomas’ language in
mind, it seems unlikely that Luther’s language of original sin de essentia hominis would have been perceived as daring, much less as alarmingly uncatholic.
The de essentia, moreover, does not at all bring Luther into proximity with
Flacius’ substantia formalis. On the most plausible reading, Luther’s claim
that sin is de essentia hominis means not that sin qua sin is what forms the
fallen human being as a creature, but only that sin has an impact on the whole
person, from the soul’s essence up to and including its powers. Sin or evil
impacts the essence of the human being, but it is not that essence. Similarly,
56. WA 42.124.32-8. Cf. LW 1.166. On Genesis 3:7. The LW editors suggest that this passage
in the Weimar edition, particularly Luther’s explanation of original sin and the essentia
hominis, may reflect not Luther’s ipsissima verba but rather a later redaction occasioned
by the Flacian controversy. This is unlikely. The text printed by Peter Seitz in Wittenberg
in 1544 with Luther’s own preface reads exactly as does the Weimar critical edition.
Given, moreover, that the Flacian controversy did not begin until 1559, it seems impossible to ascribe the words attributed to Luther here to his editors. For one effort to sort out
some of the critical questions related to the editing of the Genesis lectures, see Mattox,
“Defender,” 259-276. The classic and deeply problematic study is Peter Meinhold, Die
Genesisvorlesung Luthers und ihre Herausgeber (Gütersloh, 1932).
57. For the medieval discussion of whether Adam was created with grace or without, see
Alister McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, 4th ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 125-129. See esp. p. 126 on Thomas’
affirmation of the belief that Adam was created with grace.
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original righteousness does not denote the ontological quiddity of prelapsarian
humankind. Instead, just as original sin leaves one fallen and fearful, so original righteousness and grace made every aspect of our first parents’ life an
uncompromised experience of joy and delight. For Luther, both original righteousness and original sin are holistic terms that pertain to the whole person.
First the one and then the other was “of the essence” of Adam and Eve.

Conclusion
This episode in the history of theology reminds us that one of the Lutheran
tradition’s central problems after Luther’s death was to make sense and impose
systematic order on his vast and varied oeuvre. As Peter once said of Paul, so
one might say of Luther that “he writes many things that are hard to understand.”58 The evangelical Lutheran movement was born in a moment of
extreme crisis and one that made Luther himself the most famous man in
Europe. Upon his return in 1522 to his university professorship after his
months of exile in the Wartburg Castle, Luther’s students attended to everything he said. Everything. The “table talks,” the sermons, the disputations, the
classroom lectures. All of it was taken down, and nearly all of it was eventually
published in the monumental Weimar edition of 120-plus volumes. The
Genesis lectures (volumes 42-44) briefly examined above are an especially
illustrative example of the difficulties one faces, and indeed that the Lutheran
reformers themselves faced, in attempting to distill clear and coherent arguments out of these various works. Indeed, for all who work on Luther today,
the difficult task of interpretation continues.
In the present confusing case, we have seen that when Luther’s recorded
words are examined with care, it becomes clear that although he sought to
underscore the deep impact of sin, like Thomas he also refused to ontologize
it as a substance rather than an absence. Unlike Thomas’ texts, however,
Luther’s lectures were not calm and deliberate. Indeed, he was highly rhetorical, at times bombastic, hyperbolic, and often frustratingly imprecise.
Clearing away the confusion this creates concerning original sin, one can see
that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Thomas and Luther
responded to a similar set of questions regarding original sin and came to
similar conclusions.
In recovering Luther’s anthropological holism, moreover, we also discover
a surprising systematic consistency in his thought. Consider sinful Adam on
the one hand and the purified Christian saint on the other. Sin for Luther means
58. 2 Pet. 3:16.
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fear and death, while holiness brings joy and life. Fear is the mechanism by
which original sin ruins everything. It is the obverse of the spontaneous gladness (2 Cor. 9:6-7) proper to the unfallen human creature before God. When
the saints’ healing from sin is at last complete, this lost gladness will be
restored. Inebriated with the love of God—so Luther—the offspring of Adam
and Eve will take up where their first parents left off.
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